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ABSTRACT

“Let’s Call Painful Sex Disorders Sexual Disabilities Instead”
A Feminist Disability Critique Of Feminist Representations And Medical
Representations Of Sexual Disorders Of Pain
by
Oyku Akin

Advisor: Linda Alcoff

Historically, gender and sexuality have been privileged sites of analysis in feminist theory.
Critical feminist engagements with “sexual dysfunction” employ gendered analysis’ of medical
and pharmaceutical interventions to sexuality in capitalist modernity in order to underscore the
ideological dimensions of modern sexuality. Although sexual disorders of pain received little
attention from feminist academics until recently, contemporary feminist work on sexual pain
disorders mimic the previous work on sexual dysfunctions in terms of analysis. Analysing recent
major feminist contributions employing different epistemological orientations to the study sexual
disorders of pain, I show that gender continues to be the privileged common category of analysis
in studying sexuality and sexual disorders with major weaknesses. On the one hand, these
feminists are able to present a critique of gendered sexual oppression reminiscent of second-wave
feminist interrogations of sexual oppression and heterosexuality in what is considered a postfeminist era of sex. On the other hand, they use sexual disabilities as a shortcut, sacrificing its
difference as a specific form of embodiment/oppression, along with its potential for producing a
productive and transformative politics. I use a feminist/queer disability studies perspective to
discuss these shortcomings and to suggest a different way to conceptualize sexual politics.
Keywords: Chronic Sexual Pain, Genito-Pelvic Pain Disorder/ Penetration Disorder, Vaginismus,
Feminist Disability Studies, Crip Studies, sexual oppression
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INTRODUCTION

In 2013 a newly updated DSM-V redefined female sexual disorders of pain,
creating the umbrella term Genito-Pelvic Pain Disorder/ Penetration Disorder which
covers a wide range of symptoms and complaints under its roof (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The specific category of sexual disorders of pain had
not gone under any significant changes since vaginismus was added alongside to
Dyspareunia in DSM-III at 1980 (American Psychiatric Association, 1980).
Compared to other sexual disorders identified in DSM that are associated with desire,
arousal, and orgasm, disorders of sexual pain had a rather low profile both in terms
of medical research as well as public discussion and social (and feminist) critique
until very recently.
In the past two decades, Leonore Tiefer and The New View Campaign
generated a particularly influential discourse critiquing medical and pharmaceutical
interventions to sexuality, arguing that medical approaches depoliticized sex and
promoted a mechanistic view of sexual desire (Kaschak & Tiefer, 2001). The New
View Campaign operated as a grassroots network between 2000-2016 and defined
their goal as challenging the pharmaceutical industry’s reduction of sexual problems
to medical matters and biology. They produced a critique of the efforts to introduce a
‘pink viagra’ to enhance sexual desire for women who suffer from “low desire” and
other biomedical oriented research in sexuality.
Roughly at the same time The New View published their manifesto, a group
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of medical researchers started questioning the validity of the medical research on
sexual pain disorders and sex therapies, questioning the “sexual” nature of pain,
diagnostic criteria, and assumptions guiding treatments (Binik, Meana, Berkley &
Kalifé, 1999). They emphasized empirical concerns, but they also marked feminist
concerns, including the importance placed on achieving intercourse.
These two critical approaches produced literature in their respective fields
with limited dialogue. Although feminist critiques of medicalization managed to
influence research on sexual problems and sexual therapy to some degree, new
medical orientations towards understanding vulvar pain beyond its association with
penetrative sex received mixed responses from feminists, with some arguing that
desexualizing pain could bury its already concealed political nature even deeper
under a sophisticated medical discourse. In a published response to Binik and his
team’s proposal to reclassify vaginismus and dyspareunia as disorders of pain rather
than sexual disorders, Tiefer suggested that such a move would be a disservice to
women who suffer such problems as long as “sexual disorders” existed in DSM
(Binik, 2005; Peer Commentaries, 2005). This difference in opinion about the proper
place of pain related to sexual activity in the DSM betrays a deeper tension between
feminist and medical perspectives that shaped the subsequent feminist engagements
with vaginismus and dyspareunia, and the changes in the category of sexual pain
disorders in DSM-V. The tension itself however, as I argue, has been taken for
granted to some degree in feminist analysis, preventing a critical interrogation and
incorporation of possibilities that could emerge from a critical medical approach, and
depriving this new medical perspective from feminist insight at a much deeper level.
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In the meantime, sexual disorders of pain slowly gained visibility. Feminist
approaches studied how heterosexual women experienced sexual disorders of pain
surrounded by a heteronormative sexual regime and medical authorities who
dismissed their concerns (Ayling & Ussher, 2008; Cacchioni, 2015; Cacchioni &
Wolkowitz, 2011; Farrell & Cacchioni, 2012; Labuski, 2015; Svedhem, Eckert &
Wijma, 2013). Medical research produced a critique of the category and proposed
new frameworks for engaging with diagnosis and treatments (Bergeron, Rosen &
Morin 2011; Bergeron, Corsini-Munt, Aerts, Rancourt & Rosen 2015; Binik, 2005;
Meana, 2009; Meana, Fertel & Maykut, 2017; Payne, Reissing, Lahaie, Binik, Amsel
& Khalifé 2006; Rosen & Bergeron, 2018). Chronic sexual pain became a growing
market for non-medical interventions and technology, with special lubes and gadgets
for relieving pain marketed towards afflicted women recently. Finally people with
dyspareunia and vaginismus published essays online, producing rare cultural and
popular representations of chronic pain with intercourse.
Researching popular representations of sexual disorders of pain, I came
across a blog post titled “Let’s Call Painful Sex Disorders Sexual Disabilities
Instead” (Zulch, 2017). In this personal essay about vaginismus, the author, a trans
man with multiple disabilities, discusses how he understands his experience with
vaginismus in terms of a sexual disability rather than a painful sex disorder because
the latter implies a total inability to enjoy sex. Emphasizing that queer and disabled
people have multiple ways of engaging with and enjoying sex, the author suggests
that even if one is committed to getting treatment to have intercourse, they can enjoy
sex in other ways; a possibility that gets lost in the term “painful sex disorder”. In
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many ways, this short essay stands apart from academic representations of sexual
disorders of pain. The afflicted person is the author, a queer, trans man, who
acknowledges that people may not seek or want to go through with treatment doctors
prescribe, yet does not cast queering sex and getting treatment as opposing political
choices, and offhandedly combines disability and sexuality in his text, showing how
the two can be thought together. This is a rather flexible stance, as I discuss later in
detail, because different feminists tend to frame both getting treatment and not
getting treatment as complying with and reproducing heteronormativity.
Neither feminist nor medical perspectives on the issue account for such
flexibility. Although medical research started to pay attention to social contexts that
could produce and sustain this kind of pain, and there are more voices within the
medical community that problematize the primacy of intercourse as a focus of
treatment and people’s lack of access to healthcare, it is unlikely that a political
critique or vision towards social justice can emerge from the medical community.
Feminist social analysis of sexual disorders of pain explicitly deals with it as a
political problem produced through gendered sexual oppression. However, it also
fails to address or accommodate the positions described above (queer, disabled,
trans) in a consistent political discourse, which diminishes its analytical power. Not
engaging with the critical medical discourse furthermore prevents the emergence of a
comprehensive social justice intervention to medical discourses. If medical
discourses are necessary targets of not only criticism but also feminist
transformations, more inter-disciplinery work could e the key to progress.
In this essay, I want to trace the possibilities that emerge from calling sexual
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pain disorders sexual disabilities. What happens if we try to address sexual pain
disorders from queer/feminist disability perspectives? How can feminist, queer
disability perspectives challenge the ways feminists think about pain with
intercourse? How can we locate this particular sexual disability within feminist
philosophies of embodiment? Finally, why should we and what insight we can gain
from this particular issue that could embolden our horizons of thinking and acting?
Answering these questions all at once is not an easy task. It is an easier task than it
would have been, if disability scholars have not already grappled with the effects of
chronic pain and illness in (re)conceptualizing disability (Crow, 1996; Wendell,
2001), addressed the conditions of invisibility of specific disabilities such as mental
disabilities (Donaldson, 2002; Lewis, 2006; Mollow, 2013; Price, 2015),
problematized sexuality and disability together (Baril, 2015; McRuer & Mollow,
2012; Wilkerson, 2012). Yet, when gender, sexuality, and disability come together in
these discussions, the bodies that are discussed are rarely heterosexual cis women
with sexual dysfunctions that feminist and medical discourses represent as afflicted
with vaginismus and dyspareunia. Still, a trans man’s call to rejecting the label of
painful sex disorder can also serve as a wake-up call to the diversity of people who
are afflicted, which is often ignored both in medical and feminist discussions.
Though diversity by itself may not be a good enough reason to argue for a disability
conceptualization and critique of sexual disorders of pain, I argue that a
feminist/queer disability framework can go beyond current feminist discourses for
producing a politics for sexual pain disorders. Another potential of such an
engagement lies in the ways it can foster alliances across different theoretical
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orientations, disciplines and political agendas for better ways of thinking and
advocating sexual agency in the face of oppression (Wilkerson, 2012).

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

If everything is socially constructed then nothing is.
If there is one claim that cuts across all humanities, and shape the ways we
understand, research a the world, that claim is that identities are socially constructed.
Social construction is a valuable conceptual tool for revealing how structural
operations of power create and hide hierarchies among people as natural facts of life.
All across the humanities, researchers critically investigate the social constructions of
normal and pathological, not only to understand and make transparent the processes
of normalization and pathologization but also to liberate bodies from the experience
of oppression. An underlying claim around most of this research is that there are no
normal bodies as such and that pathologized and stigmatized difference is
contextually bound to changes in historical and material realities, that are ordered
differently to exclude and include, oppress and liberate certain bodies. Criminology,
feminist, queer, disability, postcolonial and critical race theories share the insight that
criminalization/pathologization of certain bodies and experiences works to create and
sustain the legitimacy of the myth of “normal/healthy” bodies and experiences,
which in turn function to structure social life in hierarchies of exclusion and
inclusion.
However, there is also a historically and materially built tendency -a socially
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constructed tendency if you will, especially in social sciences and humanities to
study the exotic and the powerless, that has little to do with liberation (the roots of
anthropology as a discipline testifies very well to this fact). A generous way to frame
this tendency at present would be to say that it is a habit that continues to haunt
social sciences. At this point, the intent might be less important than the context - in
many ways, it is easier to study structures of oppression through the lives of the
oppressed rather than the privileged, because it is so much easier to access the lives
of marginalized people. This uneven application itself has the power of legitimizing
and justifying certain behaviours, desires and fears as more or less real than others.
This focus, coupled with the importance and necessity of political direction for
liberation sometimes creates a representation of reality in which marginalized come
to occupy a strange position as facilitators of their oppression and the ones who are
supposed to sacrifice their ‘socially constructed’ desires for the good of all. The
problem is that, although one can argue all desires and fears are socially constructed,
they could also be critical to one’s safety, survival and sense of self. When social
constructivist approaches abstract the world within this implicit hierarchy of desires
and fears, often it is marginalized people who are expected to sacrifice their truths
and needs. Recent years marked a turn towards embodiment and materiality from
social constructivist explanations for gender, sexuality and disability studies. These
interventions come from actual bodies whose differences cannot be abstracted to fit
existing forms of social analysis. Critiques of social models of trans and disability
identities (sometimes both at the same time) question the effectiveness of the social
model for addressing and accounting for the needs of trans and disabled people who
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experience varying degrees of oppression across a spectrum of social and bodily
conditions. I have been particularly inspired by These critiques underscore a diversity
of experiences and oppressions shaped by intersecting identities of race, class,
ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, ability. I will show how critiques raised in these
discourses can help us address feminist representations of sexual disorders.
DISABILITY LIKE GENDER
“Is it not necessary, to at least ask if there is a difference between
disability/impairment and gender/sex—and, since there obviously is, how that
difference operates in the present situation?” (Samuels, 2002).
Discussing a pain/penetration disorder in terms of a disability challenge the
disciplinary boundaries between gender/disability studies. Genitalia is often
considered as belonging to queer or gender studies domains, as a marker of sexual
difference (Baril, 2015). However, it is also a condition that ableist norms of
sexuality cannot contain. Feminist engagements with pain/penetration disorder
discuss the norms of sexuality in terms of heteronormativity and cultural misogyny
rather than ableism. The social experience of gender is thought to cause both
impairments in the body and oppression through the social organization of gender. It
is important that impairment is understood as a bodily condition rather than a
psychiatric or mental condition in feminist readings that acknowledge the importance
of pain. This can be partly explained by some feminisms relation to anti-psychiatry
movement, a stance that also has roots in feminist critiques of medicalization (Angel,
2012).
The dominant model of constructivism in disability studies locate the origins
8

of disability in the social world and its politics, placing body and its politics in the
periphery of this frame, as the effects of discursive construction (Garland-Thomson,
2005). When it comes to mental illnesses, being the effect of a discursive production
haunts accounts of madness. Feminist anti-psychiatric readings of ‘mad woman’
influence both popular and official discourses of madness, meanwhile erasing the
actual experience of being a mad woman (Donaldson, 2002). Similarly queer
accounts of social oppression use psychotic breakdowns and painful experiences
such as self-cutting as metaphors and idioms which negate the real implications of
these experiences (Johnson, 2015). These engagements bypass the pain of cutting
and being mad but use them to furnish a rebellious desire towards embracing painful
experiences that can be generalized into identity categories such as women or queer.
This move however, ignores such pain is not equally distributed neither within nor
across these categories. Problematizing the desirability of disability means to pay
attention to pain and recognize the ways pain complicates a disability desire.
This is not a complete dismissal of desire. It is a move highlighting the
importance of tending to pain and undesirability which, typically goes unmentioned
in disability studies (Price, 2015). Raising the issue of undesirability in this way
necessitates questioning and re-working the impairment/disability divide in
significant ways, a move Kim Hall describes as “reconceptualizing disability and the
body as sites of becoming rather than of being and as sites of affirmation” (Hall,
2015).
What is necessary for such reconceptualizations of body and disability? If
body -and impairment- are not neutral backgrounds, how does that affect our
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politics? In Disability Studies, Anna Mollow’s intersectional reading of Meri NanaAma Danquah's account of depression demonstrates on the one hand that impairment
itself can be political while at the same time showing that painful experience of
depression shouldn’t be simply negated as discourse (2006). Engaging with Shelly
Tremain’s argument that individuals reliance upon impairment categories serve to
reproduce hegemonic constructions of disability (2005), Mollow considers the
possible effects of recognizing depression as a definable and describable disease.
Through a careful analysis of Danquah’s narrative, she points out how Danquah
subverts the hegemonic discourse of disability. Danquah not only connects her
depression to her social position as a black woman but also reveals how the medical
diagnosis is selectively deployed in racialized and gendered lines of power. Thus,
Mollow argues that a black woman’s access to depression diagnosis can itself be a
resistant practice which undermines the always already political expectation that
black women suffer quietly and stoically.
The politicization of impairment through taking despair as an embodied
condition is important and points out that relations between body and social worth
exploring. Elizabeth Wilson (2011) suggests that instead of completely rejecting
medical or social models, we need to rework both of them. This is precisely the effort
Wilson makes in her book Gut Feminism (2015). While she suggests that feminism
should overcome its anti-biological stance, she argues that the recent attempts to
include biology are problematic due to an uncritical over-reliance on the claims of
neuroscience which prioritizes brain and nervous system over the whole body. Thus
she tries to establish a new frame for understanding depression, asserting that “such a
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framework would need to be able to handle how the pharmacokinetic, psychological,
and social realms both align and dissociate, how they are antagonistically
attached...one name for such a framework might be transference” (p.106). Discussing
the clinically unstable history of melancholy and the importance of signs and
symptoms in its diagnosis, she suggests that medical and social models compete to
find a primary cause and locate the cure in that position. Drawing attention to the
physical symptoms of depression (eating, sleeping, vitality), she articulates
psychoanalysis and psychopharmacology as different lines of attack into the same
bioaffective system. She points out that clinical researches show the quality of the
relationship between therapist and client, rather than the specific mode of therapy
(whether psychoanalytic or behavioral) is more effective in curing depression.
Wilson marks that it is the intervention into the patterns of the relationality of the
patient, in which body-mind, affect, social and politics are entangled with, that cures
(p.119). For Wilson, transference is not a psychoanalytic concept explaining
depression. She is trying to introduce a way of framing effects and experiences crosscutting bodies, minds, environments, and social worlds we usually define in linear
successions, within a different relationality, outside established duality of political
and biological. Her critique points out that a political discussion of depression
remains quite limited if it continues to unfold around the morality of pharmacological
intervention. This means that interrogating the economic and political organization of
pharmacological intervention by itself, without also considering the content of
pharmacological intervention (as in the chemicals in the body and how they move)
locates biology (as science and as phenomena) beyond politics. Sociopolitic
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explanations of depression, according to Wilson, usually fall into this trap of treating
the medical or biological knowledge as a monolithic technology, instead of a
dynamic field of knowledge production, which naturalizes medicine itself.
CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST APPROACHES TO SEXUAL PAIN DISORDERS

In the past decade, along with a couple of articles, two book-length qualitative,
empirical studies dealing with sexual pain disorders came out, analyzing the social
and cultural relations of sexual pain: Big Pharma, Women, And The Labour Of Love
by Thea Cacchioni (2015) and It Hurts Down There: The Bodily Imaginaries of
Female Genital Pain (2015) by Christine Labuski. These recently published
ethnographic works draw from significantly different feminist literatures and use
different frameworks in their analysis. Although they seem to be in different camps
due to their different views on the importance of medical recognition and treatment
of sexual pain, I argue that the assumptions that guide them in bridging politics and
sexuality limit both projects in similar ways, especially when it comes to articulating
a feminist political vision of sexual pain.
Thea Cacchioni is among the few in New View campaign to engage with
sexual pain disorders. As I discussed before, The New view campaign mostly
focused on the medicalization of sexual desire, rather than pain, in order to challenge
the pharmaceutical efforts produce a desire enhancing pill for women. In Big
Pharma, Women, And The Labour Of Love (2015) Cacchioni builds upon her
dissertation work and her subsequent research on medicalization. Emphasizing that
feminist work on medicalization rarely attends women’s voices, especially on issues

12

related to pain, Cacchioni uses her qualitative empirical research with “women who
perceive themselves as having sexual problems” (p. 3) and physicians who attended
them in Vancouver in early 2000s. Her analysis frames her empirical research in two
axes of biomedicalization and heteronormativity. Big Pharma, Women, And The
Labour Of Love is not entirely about the medicalization of sexual pain, but Cacchioni
argues that pain holds an important place in her discussions and devotes a chapter to
it, as well as bringing it up throughout the book. In many ways, Cacchioni’s
discussion parallels the social model of understanding disability.
Like Cacchioni, Christine Labuski conducted qualitative research in a clinic
that specializes in treating sexual pain disorders. Her analysis brings together theories
of embodiment and feminist materialisms to provide a framework for understanding
vulval pain as an embodied condition rooted in social relations. Her model is more
closely aligned to disability approaches that discuss the materiality of body-mind and
emphasize the importance of pain in conceptualizing disability.
CAUSES OF SEXUAL PAIN
The authors’ approach to explaining causes of chronic sexual/vulval pain
differ in some ways although they both operate from the assumption that it is a
condition best understood in its relation to gender. In explaining the causes of
chronic sexual pain, Cacchioni refers to The New View literature, critiquing
medicine’s emphasis on biology in explaining and treating biopsychosocial problems
(p.42,43). She argues that along with other sexual disorders, causes of sexual
disorders of pain can be understood as political rather than biological, although she
does not explain how and which politics may be the reason for chronic sexual pain.
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She acknowledges that patients, therapists, and medical researchers are mostly in
agreement that chronic sexual pain is not directly related to a history of sexual abuse,
as opposed to the common understanding of the issue (p.49,50). So while she
maintains that politics are related to the emergence of this kind of pain, instead of
making direct connections, she concentrates her efforts on critiquing the politics that
govern the experience of pain; which in her view are best understood in terms of
medicalization and compulsory heterosexuality (p. 114).
Labuski however, devotes most of her book to provide a theoretical
explanation of chronic vulvar pain, through feminist science studies and new
materialisms, to articulate this phenomenon as a product of relations between the
body and social world. She explicitly refers to Elizabeth Wilson’s Gut Feminism as a
prominent influence, however, unlike Wilson whose approach is distinguished for
rejecting the separability of social and biological causes and the critique of the search
for a primary cause for embodied experience either within the social or biological
body, Labuski insists that origins of vulval pain are located in the social domain
(249, 256). Although her arguments regarding how and why this is the case are
wrapped in a complex theoretical discussion, these causes can be summarized as lack
of knowledge and education, sexual repression, religious and conservative attitudes
towards sexuality, social hostility towards women’s sexuality and sexual abuse.
REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN WHO SEEK TREATMENT
Cacchioni doesn’t deny women’s claims of experiencing pain during
intercourse but argues that experience of pain doesn’t necessitate recognizing it as a
medical problem or a disorder, and she focuses on women’s perceptions of their
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conditions (p. 3,4,5). She asserts that women perceive themselves as having sexual
problems because they fail to conform to dominant sexual scripts (p. 66,79). Pain
with intercourse gains significance because intercourse is prized above all other sex
(p. 78,79,80). In other words, women wouldn’t have such problems -or at least would
not perceive these issues as problems- if a heteronormative patriarchal society did not
demand it. Thus, women seek treatment to conform to existing social and sexual
norms. It is also important to note that Cacchioni mainly treats dyspareunia and
vaginismus as almost exclusively as sexual problems, without going into detail about
how pelvic pain might also affect different dimensions of women’s lives. Labuski, on
the other hand, takes a different approach by emphasizing the toll vulval pain takes
on women’s sexual, social and physic lives. In her account, seeking treatment is not
characterized solely by a desire to conform to sexual norms and expectations, but
marks women’s investment in their social and sexual well beings.
This stark difference in reading women’s desire for seeking treatment causes
a symmetrical opposition in how women’s experiences with treatment are understood
by the authors. For example, for Cacchioni women who decide to stop treatment and
disavow “labor of love” despite the heavy social and interpersonal burdens that come
with such a move are bold (p.108) , whereas Labuski marks that getting through
treatment is not for the faint-hearted (p. 107).
Authors’ understandings of why women seek treatment also influence the
ways they discuss the anxiety and distress women express. Cacchioni, for example
emphasizes the coital imperative as the major source of distress for women and pays
more attention to how women understand and navigate sexual expectations they feel
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obligated to fulfill (p. 79,80,84), while Labuski pays more attention to women’s
backgrounds in terms of their sexual and medical histories, religious beliefs, attitudes
towards their bodies and sexualities ( p. 41,47, 55, 183, 105, 134, 210) . However,
neither provide an integrated account of how material and bodily differences (class,
race, age, disability) may influence experiences of sexual pain (and its treatment),
although both acknowledge that these are important aspects that should be
considered.

CONCEPTUALIZING TREATMENT

In conceptualizing the treatment of sexual pain, both Cacchioni and Labuski
differentiate between pharmaceutical, surgical and physical therapy options available
for treating sexual pain, both expressing a preference for physical therapy, though
their conceptualization of physical therapy is remarkably different. Cacchioni argues
that techniques of dilation, relaxation, tension release, and other cognitive behavior
approaches associated with physical therapy can be considered demedicalized against
a backdrop of creams, suppositories, pills, and surgical interventions (p.55-59). She
also acknowledges that for some women this kind of treatment brings feelings of
empowerment (p. 3,48). Labuski is more enthusiastic about empowering aspects of
physical therapy, especially a form of it which she considers an inside-out approach
that involves therapist’s manual contact with patients pelvic floor (p.104). Labuski
frames this preference in her understanding of the relationship between social,
emotional and biological causes of pelvic pain, although she points out that more
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than a few women refuse to go through with physical therapy due to extreme anxiety
they feel (p. 108, 109) . In a rather odd fashion, she quotes a patient as she describes
being reminded of her past experiences of sexual abuse during a physical therapy
session and rejected further treatment, to make her case for the effectiveness of
physical therapy (p. 106-107). Both authors also acknowledge that women find the
cost of physical therapy in terms of money and time rather frustrating.

POLITICAL VISIONS

Cacchioni’s approach stresses both compulsory sexuality and dominant
scripts of sexuality that govern women’s experiences with sexual pain and other
disorders. She analyses women’s experiences of unwilling deviancy from these
forms of socially sanctioned forms of sex to interrogate whether subversive or
transgressive sexuality can emerge. Cacchioni differentiates between subversive and
transgressive sexualities by referring to Beasley et al. (2012). While transgressions
are defined as non-deliberate, subversions are reflexive underminings that could
change norms. Cacchioni considers actions of most of her informants as
transgressive, as they refuse to comply with certain treatments, give up on
heterosexual relationships or some heteronormative sexual norms. It is interesting
that it is this last group Cachioni considers the most cheerful or upbeat about their
situation, yet they are also among the transgressors. It seems that Cacchioni is
questioning the very possibility of subversive sexuality, as she concludes that
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women’s choices and experiences of sex will always be shaped by social forces that
go beyond sexuality and gender (p.117). Labuski emphasizes the importance of the
cultural configuration of women’s sexuality as the main political object of her
analysis. She defines and understands sexual pain as a matter of culturally produced
alienation and disinvestment towards women’s sexuality, which governs women’s
sexual selves and experiences, and thus frames the politics in terms of attending to
those cultural forces (p. 147, 148, 241-249).
These seemingly very different projects on sex pain unite on several issues. Even
though they seem to be in opposite camps when it comes to medicalization, they
express a preference for a type of treatment, they locate both the original cause of
pain and the distressing experience it creates in the social world, and thus they
articulate feminist concerns about how this social/cultural world needs to change.
Although authors’ particular political visions and commitments shape their
representations in different ways, political visions that emerge from these projects in
terms of what is political about sexual pain and what a politics of sexual pain might
look like follow the same lines of thought. For example, whether women seek
medical attention against or for their interests in the long term, or whether this
attention itself is part of the oppression or resistance, doesn’t make a difference in
terms of what feminism can do for sexual pain or what sexual pain can do for
feminism.
According to Cacchioni medicalization hides the true (political) nature of
women’s sexual problems by representing them as individual problems, foreclosing
sexuality from political critique and action. Medicalization is a way of coercing
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women into structures of compulsory sexuality and heteronormativity. Because
medical treatment reproduces dominant ideas about gender and sexuality, she argues
for a politics against further medicalization of the problem of chronic sexual pain.
Cacchioni admits that medicalization of sexual pain is driven by women’s demands
and it is very selectively accessible to a few among many, yet she does not explore
these matters while discussing the role of medicalization in reproducing
heteronormativity. Is heteronormativity an essential premise of medicalization or is
that a form that can be challenged and transformed? If the latter is true, how is such a
transformation is possible?
Labuski answers yes to this question, by discussing at length what she sees as
an empowering medical approach: Physical Therapy. In Labuski’s account, physical
therapy reveals that women’s sexual pain is political by addressing embodied
“cultural dis-ease” towards women’s sexuality (p. 26). Sexual pain is thus understood
as embodied traumas of gender created by cultural attitudes towards and sex such as
conservatism, ignorance, and abuse, which are the targets of the feminist politics of
sexual pain Labuski argues for. However, even if we accept Labuski’s account of
physical therapy -which seems highly flawed from a number of perspectives, her
vision of a feminist politics of medicine does not challenge Cacchioni’s point that
although medical help might be beneficial, it still works on an individual basis. They
also differ in the way that Cacchioni sees physical therapy as a possibly
demedicalized, do it yourself approach whereas Labuski prefers a type of it that
requires expert attention. Both accounts frame the real political issue as addressing
the social conditions that create women’s sexual oppression, with feminist politics of
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medicine functioning only as far as promoting one treatment over others.
The critical assumption that guides both of these works is that medicine, or
some forms of medicine, hides “the real” social thus political nature of the problem
by representing it in terms of an individual’s biology and psychology. Real nature
thus implies a causal relation that originates in the social world and its political
organization - with the emphasis on the political organization of gender- that ends up
with chronic sexual pain being inscribed on women’s bodies. The major weakness of
this scheme, however, lies in the problem of actually explaining how the political
organization of gender causes the type of oppression understood as chronic sexual
pain. What are the conditions that produce embodied chronic sexual pain? Even
though, for example, Labuski is relatively confident that there is a link between
sexual abuse and chronic sexual pain, she is unable to account for the mediating
factors between the two. As of yet, neither sexual orientation, religion, race, ethnicity
or class explain why some women experience it as they do, or how these experiences
might facilitate, or bend gendered embodiment towards chronic pain.
It is important here to ask what enables the confidence with which these
arguments are made, without or despite empirical evidence. I argue that what
influences and makes this move possible is avoiding a discussion of sexual pain as a
common part of women’s sexual lives and experiences. The ghost of the possibility
of pain with intercourse, almost always present as a possibility in the world, haunts
these analyses of sexual pain disorders. Both accounts start by acknowledging that
there is a difference between chronic sexual pain and ‘normal’ or common sexual
pain, but neither the status of common pain nor the original division between these
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two types is addressed. This primary evasion allows the authors to treat all sexual
pain as the same pain, which underneath the guises of sexual disorders of pain, of
perception, of cultural and theoretical explanations, remains the common one.
Common sexual pain with intercourse is a part of women’s sexual landscape
both in terms of cultural myths and expectations as well as in terms of experience.
Results of a recent U.S. nationally representative survey show that 30% of women
experienced pain during their most recent vaginal intercourse experience, while men
reported %7. (Herbenick, Schick, Sanders, Reece & Fortenberry, 2015). According
to the findings, about 2/3 of men and 43% of women didn’t bring up the pain with
their partners due to different reasons which include thinking it as normal, not
important or not important to their partners. Whereas most men described pain as “a
little” and none as “quite a bit” or “extremely” painful, women’s descriptions cover a
considerable range from a little to moderately painful and quite a bit painful. It seems
that good and bad sex has gendered definitions. According to Debby Herbenick, one
of the authors of the report, "When it comes to 'good sex’ women often mean without
pain, men often mean they had orgasms" (Loofbourow, 2018). The results of the
survey reflected that for men the quality of sex is measured through pleasure, while
for women being free from pain is an important variable in measuring the quality of
intercourse. These results shows that the definitions of good and bad sex are
gendered, consistent with Sara McClelland’s assertion that “ ...for men bad sex might
refer to less satisfaction, whereas for women it includes the possibility of emotional
and physical harm” (McClelland, 2009).
It seems that some degree of pain is common for women in sex(ual
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intercourse). Why does one gender consistently draw the short straw when it comes
to sex and what does it tell us about the gendered politics of sex? This old and a
rather unfashionable question calls forth the infamous “sex wars” of second-wave
feminism which dealt with (heterosexual) penetrative sex itself as a problem that
needs to be addressed.
I argue that both authors’ approaches and arguments are crafted from a
politics of gendered sexuality whose actual object is women’s common sexual pain or rather the very commonness of sexual pain- but they present them as arguments
about chronic sexual pain. Reasons of common sexual pain are often listed as stress,
fatigue, lack of arousal or lubrication, or partner roughness. Cacchioni refers it once
as “... infrequent pain with intercourse or pain caused by particularly rough or violent
sex” (p.48) This kind of pain is assumed to emerge in the moment, in that particular
sexual act, last for a short while without long term consequences. It is specific to the
situation, and depends on how that situation unfolds between partners, as opposed to
the chronic pain medical and feminist perspectives I attend here focus on. But this
conceptual slippage between common and chronic pain allows them to problematize
these women’s desire for “normal” sex and represent women as misled agents of
their oppression. Problematizing heterosexuality, or sexual repression through the
bodies and lives of heterosexual women with dyspareunia rather than all women is
only possible if one does not acknowledge or attribute any importance to the
commonness of sexual pain or deny that it exists altogether.
In other terms, these explanations understand chronic sexual pain as a
condition that emerges due to an intensification of gendered sexual oppression that is
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also the cause of common sexual pain. If we accept that underlying causes are same
for both situations, then common pain becoming chronic can be explained by a
difference in the quantity or quality of experiences of women, which may be
measured through social analysis. However, because both accounts largely depend on
experiences of white, middle-class women with no visible disabilities, it is not
possible to discuss the social causes of intensification through anything other than the
seemingly uniform category of gender.
Problem with using chronic pain as a metaphor for gendered sexual
oppression is twofold. On the one hand, it further marginalizes a condition that is
already and commonly defined by its invisibility as both authors acknowledge
women often don’t come forward with their condition to seek help, neither from
doctors nor from their friends and family. In the case that they do they don’t receive
the care they need. On the other hand, situating and discussing sexual pain this way
protects the illusion of pain-free (healthy, or good) sex as the normal and usual
experience.

MEDICAL DISCOURSES ON SEXUAL PAIN

Changes to DSM-V came after an increasing number of medical studies and
clinical trials on sexual pain disorders over the past decade, which revealed a wide
range of problems and complications associated with classifying female sexual
disorders of pain under the two different categories of vaginismus and dyspareunia.
Many of the symptoms that overlap between these two diagnosis’ and increasing
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research raised doubts to whether they could simply be separated from each other, as
experiencing pain during and after intercourse (dyspareunia) and inability to have
intercourse due to unconscious muscle spasm(vaginismus). Considering that
dyspareunia can trigger vaginismus, these intersecting symptoms raised doubt about
the mutual exclusivity of such experiences. This reconceptualization also reworked
the assumed etiological differences between the two, dyspareunia as organic and
vaginismus as psychological.
According to DSM-V, a woman is diagnosed with genital pelvic pain disorder
only if she has clinically significant distress with one or more of the following
symptoms for at least 6 months (1) difficulties with vaginal penetration during
intercourse, (2) genito-pelvic pain during vaginal intercourse or penetration attempts,
(3) fear or anxiety associated with genito-pelvic pain or vaginal penetration, or (4)
tightness of the pelvic floor muscles during attempted vaginal penetration. Clinically
significant distress clause exists for all female sexual dysfunctions and underscores
that if women are not distressed by being unable to have intercourse, they are not
supposed to be identified as suffering from a disorder. DSM-V also cautions that the
cause of the distress should not be the result of partners difference in desire for
intercourse, meaning that if a woman is fine with not having intercourse but stressed
due to her partners' demands, she would not get a diagnosis, at least in theory. DSMV points out a number of things a physician should carefully take note of before
making a diagnosis, including whether the patient is going through some big changes
in life such as moving, changing jobs, having kids and so on and/or having
relationship problems with their partner, or other significant people in their lives.
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DSM-V also cautions that, for women to partake in pleasurable intercourse, they
need some good foreplay and attention to their clitoris - although it is put in a more
clinical language. In a way, DSM-V does acknowledge that sex and sexual problems
are not separate from the rest of one’s life, that some women seek treatment because
they are pressured by their partners and they would not have done so in a different
situation, that these problems commonly occur due to a partner’s inconsiderate or
inadequate behavior in and out of bed, and yet still strives to function as a diagnosis
manual.
Rather than exploring the organizing logic and theories of DSM as a whole to
critique its framing of sexual dysfunctions, I find it more useful to treat it as a
patchwork of conflicting demands and forces, as they operate in the world DSM is
only a part of, due to its role as mediator between the reality of a doctors office and
the ever-changing rhetorics on sex and sexuality. On the one hand, DSM-V shows us
that feminist critiques of medicalization have managed to establish themselves as
powerful rhetoric. On the other hand, it shows us the limits of existing rhetoric for
mediating reality, as far as it continues to function as a diagnostic manual.
Almost two decades ago, a group of researchers started challenging the
dominant medical discourse on sexual disorders of pain. These challenges targeted
the validity of diagnostic criteria, as well as standard treatment options by pointing
out the lack of empirical evidence and controlled research about dyspareunia and
vaginismus. Binik, probably the most prominent and influential challenger, who is
part of the group responsible for the recent changes in DSM-V, pointed out that
medical literature on vaginismus and dyspareunia can be traced back to three
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thousand years, but their conceptualizations as primarily sexual problems emerged
after the Freudian revolution in the 20th century, and that conceptualization remained
unchanged even though dominance of psychodynamic theories waned from
American psychiatry (1999). Critics of this conceptualization as “sexual” argue that
it focuses on “ability to be penetrated as a fundamental determinant of sexual
function in women” (Rosenbaum 2018).
This emerging body of research engaged with chronic sexual pain in different
ways, including controlled studies measuring and comparing the effectiveness of
common treatments such as CBT, biofeedback, surgery, pharmaceutical treatments.
Treatment goals were reconsidered in light of the critique that penetration as a goal
without considering pleasure was not enough. More recent studies focus on bisexual
and lesbians, challenging the notion that only heterosexual women experience
vaginismus and dyspareunia, and examining how same-sex relationships may have
an effect on the experience of vulva-vaginal pain (Sobecki-Rausch, Brown & Gaupp,
2017). There is a lot of interest in designing multi-model treatments that address
psychological, interpersonal and physical aspects of pain and clinical trials show
positive results, though there are no controlled studies yet (Bergeron, Corsini-Munt,
Aerts, Rancourt & Rosen 2015; Meana, Fertel & Maykut, 2017).
Comparison of different treatments reveals interesting results. Researchers
found that although surgery for vulvar vestibulitis (one of the most common subtypes
of dyspareunia with no obvious biological component other than pain) produced
quickest results, cognitive behavior therapy also produced similar levels of success.
Lidocaine, a numbing cream once prescribed as a first line treatment, is now
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considered no more effective than placebo. Noting that rather than what specific
method of treatment is used, how the treatment is accomplished seems to make a
difference, researchers become interested in how social and cognitive aspects of
treatment and pain management, such as relationship factors, doctor-patient
relationship and patient cognition towards treatment might affect treatment. Based on
the most recent reviews, psychological treatments are recommended as first-line
treatments for medical interventions. Pelvic floor physical therapy is another
recommended approach, and manual pelvic floor therapy is considered promising,
although there are no randomized controlled trials for it yet and some experts are
cautious about the limits of a Physical Therapy only approach, due to possible
harmful effects on women (Rosenbaum, 2018).
Recent approaches share a renewed interest in discussing the matter from a
psychosocial perspective. Effectiveness of psychological intervention, coupled with
perplexing improvements in a large percentage of women who don’t receive any
treatment suggest that psychosocial circumstances have an important effect in the
manifestation and management and treatment of chronic vulva-vaginal pain. It is
suggested that experience of pain (with birth, intercourse or during first tampon
insertion) coupled with fear and anxiety might explain the onset of chronic pain.
Self-efficacy is shown to be a differentiating factor in effective treatment and pain
relief, and there is an increased focus on how positive cognition effects treatment.
Interestingly, it seems that women who attribute pain to physical reasons rather than
psychosocial causes seem to have less stress and lower rates of pain.
Of course, it is not possible to talk about a total conceptual or practical shift
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when it comes to how vaginismus and dyspareunia are understood and treated in
medical settings. Among the researchers, the only consensus is that better clinical
trials and research are necessary to assess how these treatments work for different
women. The approaches I outlined above are relatively new, and not every
practitioner is in favor of current trends. The suggestion that this new combined
category should be moved out of sexual dysfunctions and moved under chronic pain
conditions received mixed responses and was not enacted in DSM-V. Those in favor
of this move argue that the category needs desexualization, as neither the symptoms
nor treatment are sexual. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the entire field of
sex therapy is only defined by its willingness to engage with sexuality, rather any
distinct mode of therapeutic intervention special to sexuality. For example, some
argue that this specialization separates matters of sexuality from rest of the therapy
enterprise, creating an artificial division between sexual problems, relationship
issues, other psychological difficulties, and important life concerns and contributes to
the societal discomfort with issues of sexuality.

CONCLUSION
The vision of justice emerging from feminist engagements with pain leaves
something to be desired, in the way that they approach the issue from limited
perspectives, including what is political about sexuality, and how sexuality is related
to politics. This is in part due to understanding the problem only in terms of
(hetero)sexuality and gender, without considering how it can also be considered as a
matter of ability-disability. Experiences of women (and women themselves)
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represented in these accounts mostly exist to provide an object of analysis for the
authors for their respective critiques of medicine and culture. In these accounts,
women do not emerge as subjects whose experiences, desires and thoughts can
inform the political visions weaved through, and on behalf of them, something
critical to feminist disability approaches. Instead of complicating and enhancing
feminist theorizing on the embodiment, agency, identity, and ethics in the
entanglements of medicine and sexuality, these experiences are cast aside, either as
moral or political failings.
These two problems are linked by a tendency to understand and analyze
sexuality primarily through gender. Gender, in return, is presented as a relatively
stable category for organizing experience. On the one hand, these feminists are able
to present a critique of gendered sexual oppression reminiscent of second-wave
feminist interrogations of sexual oppression and heterosexuality in what is
considered a post-feminist era of sex. On the other hand, they use sexual disabilities
(if we borrow the term from Zulch) as a shortcut, sacrificing its difference as a
specific form of embodiment/oppression, along with its potential for producing a
productive and transformative politics.
Cacchioni’s critique of medicalization can be read parallel to the social model of
disability in several ways, including a marked effort to distance subjects of the
analysis from the category of disorder, and reading impairment/sexuality divide in a
way that privileges a rational subject untouched by the materiality of experience.
It can be argued Labuski avoids these problems by emphasizing how sexual
impairment is produced by social and political contexts of women’s lives. However,
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her analysis fails to take into account both the diversity of women’s concerns and the
causes of their problems. She operates within a normative framework in which
sexuality is largely defined by politics of gender, defined and understood in
traditional ways: sexual education, religious oppression, sexual abuse, and
conservative attitudes come to define the gendered experience of sexuality. One can
perhaps overlook this focus if it didn’t blindside the author herself to problems of her
approach. When a survivor of sexual abuse, who we are told is an older Christian
woman, feels uncomfortable and triggered during a recommended physical therapy
session, Labuski fails to recognize that perhaps the problem lies with the mode of the
treatment rather than “faint-heartedness” of women who seek solutions.
As Cacchioni emphasises, it is not likely that medical solutions to chronic
pelvic pain will be popular due to how expensive getting treatment is. It is still
important that patients to have more of a say in what kind of treatment they will be
getting. Though we don’t know how “self-efficacy” exactly helps, it does suggest
that patients feelings of agency matter. Rather than the type of treatment feminist
politics should look at the whole process of diagnosis and treatment, including the
processes through which people are given and refused diagnosis.This perspective
have to address that some women with chronic pelvic pain issues are not interested in
getting treatment for penetrative sex but are directed to sex therapy nonetheless.
On a different note, a feminist disability approach has to consider both
patients and feminists insistence that problem is not “in their heads”. This insistence,
at least for people with chronic come from their experiences with health providers
who dismiss their pain as not being real by saying it is in their heads. Recent
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orientations in medicine consider how minds, nerves, genitals, interpersonal and
social realities all facilitate the experience of pain while also acknowledging that
dismissing patients concerns have an impact on worsening pain intensity.
However, medical models return to psychology also has to be approached
with caution in terms of making easy connections between pain and social
phenomena. For example, there seems to be a renewed emphasis on the effect of
religion, mainly due to number of complaints coming in from Turkey and other
middle eastern countries. Transnational differences have to carefully accounted for
these comparisons to make sense, as numbers are not natural indicatives of reality.
A feminist politics need to go beyond a critique of medicalization to actively
transform medical research and intervene to social/political contexts of sex. This
means to influence and deepen research on sex and sexual pain, and also producing
better accounts of sexual pain (and desire, and sexual experiences in general) that
connect a wide range of experiences together. Especially, a feminist politics of
sexuality should consider common pain itself seriously and produce sexual politics
against oppressive sexual norms. Medical research reveals that about 40% of no
treatment control groups also achieve similar results with treatment groups, which
reveal the importance of interpersonal and social mechanisms in play. This would
necessitate of a study that can show how different sexual scripts become accessible
to different people and how they travel through libidinal economies. Instead of
limiting the study of sexual pain to clinic patients, and relying on a medical
definition of painful/painless, future research should explore pain as it manifests in
and out of clinics.
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What kind of strategies people use to avoid pain in sexual and romantic encounters?
How understandings of normal and abnormal pain are created in daily life and
managed? Such research cannot limit itself to able-bodied heterosexuality or
cissexuality. Lesbians, bisexuals, transmen, and experiences of trans women who
undergo sex reassignment surgery should be included in these narratives of managing
pain. How different identities learn and manage to overcome shame and stigma
attached to sex, and navigate painful experiences can bolster a new cultural politics
of sex and illuminate the ways people exercise sexual agency in different ways.
Instead of focusing on (proving) the primacy of social origins rather than bodily
origins, this perspective must attend to material and ideological that organize
relations between the two, for different women of class/race/ethnicity/age/ability.
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